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EvidenceCorner | Dying Declarations

“As I Lay Dying ”
1

A Halloween meditation on the use of dying declarations in Montana
By Cynthia Ford
Montana, like the federal system, has a hearsay exception for
“dying declarations.” If the out-of-court declarant is unavailable
for trial, either by death or some other 804(a) reason1, his/her
out-of-court statement may be admissible despite a hearsay
objection if both of two requirements are met:
1. At the time the declarant made the statement,
she believed that her death was imminent
AND
2. The statement concerns the cause or
circumstance of that impending death.
There are two primary explanations for the admissibility of
this sort of hearsay. One is religiously-based: if you are about
to die, and you believe in any form of judgment after death, you
would be least likely to lie at the very moment that judgment is
upon you. I always picture the declarant lying on his deathbed,
able to see the tunnel of light and perhaps St. Peter at the gate at
the end of it, and deciding that it would be a bad time to add a
lie to the list of sins already on the book. Even if you are not a
firm believer, Pascal’s utilitarian “wager” for belief in God may
make sense now, and even more on your deathbed:
Let us weigh up the gain and the loss involved
in calling heads that God exists. Let us assess the
two cases: if you win, you win everything: if you
lose, you lose nothing. Do not hesitate then: wager
that he does exist. 2
1 This is the title of William Faulkner’s seventh novel, which in turn was taken
from Homer’s Odyssey. Agamemnon is speaking to Odysseus: “As I lay dying, the
woman with the dog’s eyes would not close my eyes as I descended into Hades.”
(Ok, used my first major, English. Stand by for the Philosophy component.)
1 A common misconception is that the declarant must have actually died soon
after making the statement. This was apparently true under the prior Montana
statute, but the Commission Comment indicates this was abandoned on adoption
of the MRE provision. Now, in both state and federal court, a dying declaration
may be admissible even if the declarant later miraculously recovered, so long
as he believed that he was about to die at the time he made the statement. Although 804(a) requires unavailability at trial before any of the 804(b) exceptions
can succeed, the declarant can be unavailable by refusing to testify despite a court
order, asserting a privilege, being too sick, or simply failing to appear despite the
best efforts of the proponent. Of course, death is another—and the clearest—
form of unavailability under 804(a), but the death can either be caused by the
circumstance which gave rise to the belief of impending death, or something else
altogether.
2 Pascal, Blaise, 1670, Pensées, translated by W. F. Trotter, London: Dent, 1910.
There is a host of secondary sources which will explain far more accurately and in
far more detail Pascal’s analysis. I recommend, as one starting point, http://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/pascal-wager/#4 See also,
At last, my second major in Philosophy is somewhat relevant!
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If you are more interested in modern rappers than old dead
Frenchmen, you may prefer the version from Kendrick Lamar3:
I’d rather not live like there isn’t a God
Than die and find out there really is
Think about it
The second rationale often expressed for the dying
declaration exception is that a person about to die doesn’t
have much skin left in the game, and stands neither to profit
nor lose from telling a lie just before he dies. Both this, and
the religiously based rationale, are wide open to rebuttal and
criticism, but the exception lives on. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme
Court has alluded to the dying declaration as an example of a
“firmly rooted” hearsay exception4, and several of its recent cases
on the Confrontation Clause contain dicta indicating that dying
declarations may escape the 6th Amendment altogether because
of their special status.
Montana vs. Federal Dying Declaration Exceptions
Montana recognized the dying declaration exception for
criminal cases at common law and then by statute5 prior to
the M.R.E.. When the Supreme Court adopted the M.R.E.
in 19776, largely based on the F.R.E., Montana consciously
chose to expand its version of this hearsay exception beyond
the federal model. If the out-of-court declarant is unavailable
for testimony at trial for one of the reasons set forth in 804(a),
M.R.E. 804(b)(2) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for:
(2) Statement under belief of impending
death. A statement made by a declarant while
believing that the declarant›s death was imminent,
concerning the cause or circumstance of what the
declarant believed to be impending death.
The federal version of this rule is F.R.E. 804(b)(2):
(2) Statement Under the Belief of Imminent
DYING, next page
3 http://rapgenius.com/Kendrick-lamar-faith-lyrics#note-159794
4 See, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 72 (Rehnquist, CJ, concurring); Ohio
v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 n.9 (recognizing dying declaration as one category of
hearsay which “rest[s] upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any
evidence within them comports with the ‘substance of the constitutional protection.’”
5 Section 93-401-27(4), R.C.M. 1947.
6 Like virtually all of the M.R.E., 804(b)(2) is substantively identical to the original
version adopted by Supreme Court Order in 1976, effective July 1, 1977.
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Death. In a prosecution for homicide or in a
civil case, a statement that the declarant, while
believing the declarant’s death to be imminent,
made about its cause or circumstances.
Different from the federal rule, Montana allows use of this
exception in all cases, both civil and criminal, whereas the
federal use is restricted to civil and homicide cases. The Montana
Evidence Commission commented:
This exception is identical to Federal and
Uniform Rules (1974) Rule 804(b)(2) except that
an introductory clause reading “in a prosecution
for homicide or a civil action or proceeding”,
is deleted. The Commission deleted this clause
because it feels that if statements of this sort are
to be admissible in homicide prosecutions, they
should also be admissible in any other criminal
prosecutions. Section 93-401-27(4), R.C.M.
1947 [superseded], admits dying declarations in
all criminal actions, and so the adoption of the
Federal rule would have been a restriction on
existing Montana law. None of the cases have
expressed the rule that dying declarations are
only admissible in prosecutions for homicide,
although the cases considering admitting dying
declarations have all been this type of prosecution.
Note that the Federal, Uniform, and Montana
rule all admit statements of this sort in civil
actions; this is a major change from the common
law. The Commission feels that if statements of
this sort are reliable enough for use in criminal
prosecutions, then they should also be used in
civil cases where the outcome does not involve
personal freedom. (Emphasis added).
There were no Montana cases dealing with dying declarations
in a civil context before the M.R.E. were adopted, presumably
because the antecedent statute was confined to criminal cases.
Furthermore, despite the invitation of the Montana Commission
to extend use of this hearsay exception to all cases, that has not
yet occurred in any case appealed to the Montana Supreme
Court since 1977.

ONLY ONE MONTANA STATE DYING
DECLARATION CASE SINCE 1977,
AND IT IS CRIMINAL
The only 804(b)(2) case from the Montana Supreme Court
since the M.R.E. were adopted was decided in 2008. Raul
Sanchez shot and killed his girlfriend, Aleasha Chenowith,
apparently because she had cheated on him with his co-worker.
At Sanchez’s trial, the prosecutor was allowed to introduce a
note written by Aleasha, apparently several days before she was
killed. The note read:
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To whom it concerns:
On July 8, 04 around 10:30 p[sic] Raul Sanchez
Cardines told me if I ever was cought [sic] with
another man while I was dating him, that he
would kill me. Raul told me he had friends in
Mexico that had medicine that would kill me and
our doctors wouldn’t know what it was till it was
to [sic] late and I would be dead.
So if I unexspetly [sic] become sick and on the
edge of death, and perhaps I die no [sic] you will
have some answers.
Aleasha Chenowith (written and printed
signature)
The trial court admitted this exhibit over the defendant’s
hearsay objection7, holding that this note fell within the dying
declarations exception in 804(b)(2), as well as two other hearsay
exceptions. The trial judge also overruled the defense objection
to a neighbor’s testimony about an oral statement Aleasha
made to her:
Pamela Ehrlich testified that Aleasha told her
that, during an argument, Sanchez stated, “[m]e
love you, [Aleasha]. Me not love you that much.
You cross me, I kill you.”
On appeal, the State argued that both the note and the
oral statement were dying declarations and thus admissible.
The Montana Supreme Court made short shrift of this
argument about both types of evidence, applying the express
requirements of the exception and finding that neither met
these requirements:
the District Court incorrectly relied on the
“statement under belief of impending death”
hearsay exception to admit Aleasha’s note.
This exception applies to statements “made by
a declarant while believing that the declarant’s
death was imminent, concerning the cause or
circumstance of what the declarant believed to be
impending death.” M.R. Evid. 804(b)(2). Aleasha’s
statements that “if I [unexpectedly] become sick”
and “perhaps I die” indicate that she viewed her
death as neither certain nor imminent. (Emphasis
original.)
State v. Sanchez, 341 Mont. 240, 247-248, 177 P.3d 444,
2008 MT 27. The Court also found that nothing in the oral
DYING, next page
7 The defendant also objected to the note on Confrontation Clause grounds, but
the trial judge never ruled on this objection. The Montana Supreme Court held
that Aleasha’s note was “testimonial” even though it was not made directly to a
law enforcement officer, and that although its admission might violate the state
and federal confrontation clauses, Sanchez forfeited his right to object on those
grounds when he murdered Aleasha. 341 Mont. at 257. But see, Giles v. California,
554 U.S. 353 (2008) (holding that the U.S. 6th Amendment right is forfeited only
when the defendant’s wrongful act was intended to prevent the declarant from
testifying against the defendant.)
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statement indicated fear of imminent death at the time Aleasha
was speaking to her neighbor. Thus, the Court found, the trial
judge committed two evidentiary errors when it admitted these
forms of hearsay. (The Court went on to hold that both errors
were harmless, in view of other evidence properly admitted
on the same point, including Sanchez’s own statements of his
intention to either slap Aleasha around or shoot her.)
The M.R.E. were adopted the year before I graduated from
law school, so we are almost the same legal age. In that time
(a lot of time), M.R.E. 804(b)(2) has been the subject of only
one case in the Montana Supreme Court. That case, Sanchez,
was criminal. Despite the Commission’s intention to open the
use of dying declarations to civil as well as criminal litigants,
no civil cases in Montana’s state courts appear to have taken
advantage of the extension.

A POST-RULES
U.S. DISTRICT COURT CIVIL CASE
The U.S. District Court for the District of Montana decided
a very interesting and illuminative dying declaration case in
1999, Sternhagen v. Dow Chemical, 198 F.Supp. 2d 1113. (It
was a civil case, to boot). The plaintiff had grown up to become
a board-certified radiation oncologist, but as a teenager he
had worked three summers mixing and spraying herbicides
on fields of crops. Thirty years later, he was diagnosed with
non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, which he believed was caused by his
exposure to the herbicide chemicals. On August 22, 1988, he
filed a products liability complaint in federal court.
Eight days later, he gave a sworn videotaped statement
“upon questioning from his attorney.” The defendants were
not notified of this event at the time, and had no opportunity to
cross-examine Dr. Sternhagen. In the statement,
Sternhagen said he could recall four labels on
the 2, 4–D barrels with which he worked while
employed with Valley Flyers and the Fuhrman
Ranch. The four were Dow, Ortho (Chevron),
Monsanto and Stauffer, i.e., the defendants in this
action. Sternhagen also described, inter alia, how
his non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma was in “stage four,”
the disease’s final stage and the point at which
the disease is considered incurable. He stated,
based upon his experience as a doctor with other
cancer patients, that the average survival time for
a person in his condition was three months, and
survival of six months would be considered “quite
outstanding.” Sternhagen said he had received the
sacrament of Last Rites from the Roman Catholic
Church about 25 times since he was diagnosed as
a step to prepare himself for death.
108 F.Supp.2d at 1115.
Clearly, Dr. Sternhagen’s attorney had read the dying
declarations rule and was trying to lay the foundation for the
posthumous use of the statement at trial.

Dr. Sternhagen did die before trial8, and before the
defendants moved for summary judgment. The plaintiffs
submitted the sworn statement in opposition to summary
judgment, to prove the truth of the facts it asserted, as the
primary basis for liability of the four named defendants:
Q: Do you recall, I realize we are going back
almost exactly 40 years—?
A: Yes, sir.
Q:—but, as you sit here now, do you recall any
labels on the 2, 4–D barrels?
A: I believe I can recall four labels. Those four
would be Dow, Ortho, Monsanto and
Stauffer, as best as I can recollect.
Q: And those would all be suppliers of the 2,
4–D which you mixed?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And which you sprayed?
A: Yes.
108 F.Supp.2d at 1116.
Judge Hatfield found that the statement conformed to
federal precedent that descriptions of ingested substances
adequately “concern the cause or circumstances” of the
imminent death. However, the judge held that the other
requirement of the exception, that the declarant believe at the
time of making his statement that his death was “imminent,”
was not met in this case. He quoted the following language
from the U.S. Supreme Court’s best-known dying declaration
case, Shepard v. U.S., 290 U.S. 96, 99-100 (1933):
[T]he declarant must have spoken without
hope of recovery and in the shadow of impending
death.... Fear or even belief that illness will end
in death will not avail itself to make a dying
declaration. There must be ‘a settled hopeless
expectation’ that death is near at hand, and what
is said must have been spoken in the hush of its
impending presence.... What is decisive is the
state of mind. Even so, the state of mind must
be exhibited in the evidence, and not left to
conjecture. The patient must have spoken with the
consciousness of a swift and certain doom.
Mrs. Shepard’s statement to her nurse about her belief that
her husband had poisoned her was disqualified because about
the same time, Mrs. Shepard had experienced an improvement
in her physical condition, and had asked her doctor “you
will get me well, won’t you?” The U.S. Supreme Court held
that these facts contraindicated the required “settled hopeless
expectation” and rendered the statement inadmissible.
DYING, next page
8 The parties had agreed to take Dr. Sternhagen’s deposition on December 14,
but he died on December 4, before that could occur.
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diagram of the proper use of this hearsay exception in Montana.
DYING, from previous page

Dr. Sternhagen fared no better. Despite the great “I am
positive I am going to die, and soon” language in his statement,
his post-statement conduct made the hearsay objection for the
defendants. Remember that he gave his statement on August
30, 1988, and prior to that date had had last rites administered
about 25 times. The fatal (sorry) facts occurred after that date:
In this court’s opinion, Sternhagen’s statement
does not fall within the dying declaration
exception. When he made the statement, he
stated he expected to live another three to six
months. He also said he continued to work in
a limited way and stated his plans to attempt
more work if his condition improved. These are
not the type of statements that support a belief
in “imminent” death, as contemplated in Rule
804(b)(2). They do not convey a state of mind
exhibiting “consciousness of a swift and certain
doom” and thus do not provide sufficient indicia
of trustworthiness to satisfy the dying declaration
exception to the hearsay rule. Additionally, his
act of taking a trip to a religious shrine to “receive
healing” does not support the notion of a “settled
hopeless expectation” that his death was near at
hand. For these reasons, the court finds the dying
declaration exception inapplicable to Sternhagen’s
statement.
108 F.Supp.2d at 1118.
(The court also rebuffed the plaintiff’s attempt to get the
statement in through the “residual” exception of F.R.E. 807.9)
It is hard to say if there was anything else plaintiff’s counsel
could or should have done to try to preserve Dr. Sternhagen’s
identification of the toxins, and it is certainly impossible to
counsel your dying clients that they should forsake additional
treatment because it might interfere with your evidentiary
strategy. We don’t make the facts, which is one of the hardest
things to accept about lawyering…

ILLUSTRATIVE PRE-RULES DYING
DECLARATION CASES IN MONTANA
My research10 revealed about 20 published cases in Montana
decided before M.R.E. 804(b)(2) went into effect. All of them
are criminal cases. I have selected just two to discuss here,
one of which is my favorite11 of all the dying declaration cases
I have ever read, both because of its colorful facts and because
it shows the paradigmatic application of the exception. The
other case shows a reversal for an improper admission of a
hearsay statement which did not meet the requirements of the
exception. Taken together, these two cases provide a good
9 Montana has retained two versions of this “catch-all” exception as 803(24) and
804(b)(5); there is no M.R.E. 807.
10 See, “A Word/Warning about Research,” below.
11 This is also the case the Montana Commission discussed (in much less detail,
more’s the pity) in its Comment to 804(b)(2): “The leading case considering this
foundation is State v. Morran, 131 Mont. 17, 30, 306 2d 679 (1956), in which the
Court reviewed most of the Montana cases in this area.”

Page 32

Dying declarations in spades
Sadly, I can only excerpt a small portion of this case, but I
hope it will be enough to induce you to read more of State v.
Morran, 131 Mont. 17, 306 P.2d 679 (1957) sometime soon.
All was not well at Buster Morran’s gas station in Malta. He
was already way behind in paying for his gas and oil, as well as
his rent, and the lessor was going to cancel his lease in August.
He had not had fire insurance, but bought and paid for a new
policy, effective June 11. At 1:00 a.m. on June 19, Buster went
to his bookkeeper’s house and dropped off the bank deposit
from the day before, as well as the books, some adding machine
tapes, and other records. At 2:45 that same morning, June 20,
a fire broke out at the gas station. Not surprisingly, the fire
marshal later determined it had been set.
Unfortunately, Morran did not act alone in the arson.
Shortly after the fire started, the whole station exploded, and
two men ran out of the building. They were Mervin Bishop
and “Turk” or “Turkey” Freestone (see why I love this case?).
Both were taken to the hospital. When they arrived, Bishop was
85% covered with 3rd degree burns, and Freestone was almost
100% covered with the same. Freestone died less than 12 hours
after the explosion; Bishop lived until the afternoon of June 23
(about 3 ½ days). The treating physician at the hospital for both
men was none other than the father of the Hon. Donald Molloy.
Dr. Molloy testified at the trial, both establishing the foundation
for the dying declarations and recounting those declarations.
Here is the testimony of Dr. Molloy which established the
foundation for the declarations:
‘Mervin Bishop asked me what was the
condition of Turk Freestone. I informed him
that Turk Freestone died shortly after they were
admitted to the hospital, and he said, ‘Am I
burned as badly as Turk?’ I said, ‘Not quite, but
just about as bad, Merv.’ He said, ‘Am I going to
live, Doc?’ I said, ‘No, Merv, you are not.” …
On Monday evening, June 20, 1955, Mervin
Bishop said to Dr. Molloy, ‘I am going to die’.
Bishop also made a statement to his friend,
Clinton Dennis, which was overheard by Dr.
Molloy to the effect that he (Bishop, a former
boxer) was ‘going down for the long count.’
The local priest also testified at the trial to reinforce the fact
that the declarant knew his death was imminent:
Within a few hours after the fire a Catholic
priest was summoned to the hospital and the last
rites of the church were administered to both
Mervin Bishop and Donald Freestone. The priest,
before administering the last rites to Mervin
Bishop, received his confession. The testimony of
the priest given at appellant’s trial indicated that
Mervin Bishop was able to respond intelligently
to the priest’s statements and that the injured
DYING, next page
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Mont. 164, 168, 32 P. 854, 856 (1893).
DYING, from previous page

man seemed to understand the solemnity of the
ceremony being performed.
With this foundation, Dr. Molloy was allowed to testify
about the contents of the statement which Bishop made in his
hospital room on the Tuesday evening (only part of which I
reproduce here), indicating that the fire was orchestrated by
Morran and that Bishop believed Morran purposely tried to kill
him and Turk to destroy evidence of the arson. Bishop said that
Morran originally contacted Turk, and Turk had Bishop hide in
the men’s room at the gas station to listen in on the proposition:
Mervin Bishop sneaked into the back room
and into the men’s rest room. Buster Morran then
came to the back room with his proposition to
Turk Freestone. He stated that he would give him
fifty to five hundred dollars, depending on how
good a job he did on burning down the Hi-Line
Servicenter. He laid the plans for them…
‘So about 2:30, 2:00 to 2:30 in the morning
Turk Freestone entered the northwest window of
the Hi-Line Servicenter and Mervin Bishop stood
jiggers while Turk Freestone entered. Mervin
Bishop then followed Turk Freestone through
the window. Then instead of setting about their
business as they were supposed to, Turk went
to the back room to obtain two tires for his car.
After he obtained the tires for his car, Mervin was
standing jiggers at the front door to make sure no
one came.
‘Turk threw a 15-gallon drum of gasoline
into the back room as he was instructed, toward
the water heater. At this point Mervin Bishop
interjected that Buster was supposed to have
turned off the flame, the pilot light in the water
heater, but he did not, and ‘I think he left it on
on purpose to catch Turkey and destroy all the
evidence.’
The trial court allowed the admission of Bishop’s hospital
statements as “dying declarations” under the Montana evidence
statute then in effect. The defendant argued on appeal that the
fact Bishop had said to one person “If you don’t stop asking
me questions, you’re going to give me a nervous breakdown”
indicated that he expected to live. The Supreme Court used the
appeal as an opportunity to review prior Montana case law on
this exception to the hearsay rule, observing that:
“…if all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the declarant at the time of
making the declarations show them to have
been made under the sense of impending death,
notwithstanding declarant may not have said he
was without hope of recovery, or was dying, or
going to die, then such declarations are admissible
in evidence.”
131 Mont. at 31, quoting from State v. Russell, 13
www.montanabar.org

The Supreme Court affirmed the judge’s admission of the
dying declaration, and affirmed the conviction.
No go: No sense of impending death at time of the
statement, even though died the same day
State v. Newman, 162 Mont. 450, 513 P.2d 258 (1973)
was decided four years before the MRE became effective.
Jack Newman was convicted of involuntary manslaughter
of his wife, Elsie Newman. She died in the late afternoon in
an ambulance on her way from Bozeman to Billings. Early
that Saturday morning, Mrs. Newman had asked two of
her neighbors to come over to the house after Mr. Newman
left. Both neighbors testified at trial that Mrs. Newman told
them defendant “had beaten her Friday night after supper
and again Saturday morning, and that she was frightened and
had to get out of the house.” After these conversations, the
county attorney came out to the house and, observing the
wife’s physical condition as well as knowing of her continuing
difficulty with alcohol, took her to the local hospital. Several
hours later, at the hospital, Mrs. Newman’s condition
deteriorated and arrangements were made for her to travel
to Billings for further treatment. The patient had unexpected
seizures in the ambulance about halfway to Billings, and died in
Park City. At trial, the husband/defendant’s hearsay objection
was overruled and the neighbors’ testimony about Mrs.
Newman’s statements was admitted. On appeal, the Supreme
Court stated simply:
The ‘dying declarations’ exception as stated in
section 93-401-27, R.C.M.1947, is not applicable
in the instant case because a ‘sense of impending
death’ was never demonstrated.
For these errors, and others, the conviction was reversed and
the case remanded for a new trial.
A Quick Look at Dying DeclaraƟons and the ConfrontaƟon
Clause 6th Amendment
As the U.S. Supreme Court has struggled to enunciate its
current Confrontation Clause jurisprudence,12 it has abandoned
its former test of “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness”
in favor of a clear requirement of confrontation through
cross-examination, either at trial or beforehand, of a person
whose out of court “testimonial” statement is used against the
accused. However, a recurring theme is suggestive dicta that
dying declarations may be exempt from the Confrontation
Clause because they were so firmly accepted before the Founders
adopted the Bill of Rights. In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36 (2004), the landmark case for modern Confrontation Clause
application, the Court devoted footnote 6 to the treatment of
dying declarations:
The existence of that exception [dying
DYING, next page
12 The “new” jurisprudence began with Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004), and continues apace today. The criminal bar will be well aware of these
cases, and the Montana corollaries; the civil lawyers among us may well be, and
may remain, oblivious, because the 6th Amendment applies only to criminal defendants.
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declarations] as a general rule of criminal hearsay
law cannot be disputed. Although many dying
declarations may not be testimonial, there is
authority for admitting even those that clearly
are. We need not decide in this case whether the
Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception for
testimonial dying declarations. If this exception
must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui
generis.
541 U.S. at 56, note 6. In Giles v. California, 554
U.S. 353 (2008), the Court said:
… two forms of testimonial statements were
admitted at common law even though they were
unconfronted. The first of these were declarations
made by a speaker who was both on the brink of
death and aware that he was dying. Avie did not
make the unconfronted statements admitted at
Giles’ trial when she was dying, so her statements
do not fall within this historic exception.
In Michigan v. Bryant, 181 S.Ct. 1143 (2011), the out of
court statements of the murder victim, made to police as he lay
mortally wounded in a gas station parking lot, might have been
dying declarations which would have forced the Supreme Court
to actually rule definitively on the effect of the Sixth Amendment
on the Confrontation Clause (or vice versa). The victim told the
police who had shot him; the gunshot wound did in fact cause
the victim’s death soon thereafter. However,
The Supreme Court of Michigan held that the
question of whether the victim’s statements would
have been admissible as “dying declarations” was
not properly before it because at the preliminary
examination, the prosecution … established the
factual foundation only for admission of the
statements as excited utterances…Because of the
State’s failure to preserve its argument with regard
to dying declarations, we similarly [to Crawford]
need not decide that question here.
Bryant, 131 S.Ct., at 1151, note 1. Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent went further:
In Crawford v. Washington… this Court
noted that, in the law we inherited from England,
there was a well-established exception to the
confrontation requirement: The cloak protecting
the accused against admission of out-of-court
testimonial statements was removed for dying
declarations. This historic exception, we recalled
in Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358 (2008); see
id., at 361-362, 368, applied to statements made
by a person about to die and aware that death
was imminent. Were the issue properly tendered
here, I would take up the question whether the
exception for dying declarations survives our
recent Confrontation Clause exceptions....
Id, at 1177.
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Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet dealt with a case
which squarely presented the status of the dying declaration vis a
vis the post-Crawford Confrontation Clause. Several state courts
have, and so far, have followed the Supreme Court’s intimations
that the Confrontation Clause does not bar dying declarations,
even where the declarations were testimonial, and even where
the accused had no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant
either at or before trial. E.g., State v. Beauchamp, 796 N.W. 2d
780, 788-95 (Wis. 2011), citing a string of other post-Crawford
state court decisions13. See also, Peter Nicolas14, ‘I’m Dying to
Tell You What Happened’: The Admissibility of Testimonial
Dying Declarations Post-Crawford, 37 Hastings Const. L.Q. 487
(2010). Montana has not yet ruled on this issue because no dying
declaration case has been presented to the Supreme Court in the
past several years.

MONTANA CONSTITUTION
Article II, Section 24 of Montana’s 1972 Constitution
provides “[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right ... to meet the witnesses against him face to face.” The
Montana Supreme Court has held that Montana’s version of
the Confrontation Clause provides even more protection to the
accused than the federal version. State v. Clark, 1998 MT 221,
290 Mont. 479, 964 P.2d 766. See also, State v. Mizenko15, 2006
MT 11, ¶57, 330 Mont. 299 (Nelson, J., dissenting); State v.
Sanchez, 2008 MT 27, 341 Mont. 240, ¶32.
In State v. Sanchez, discussed above, the prosecutor was
erroneously allowed to admit two out-of-court statements by the
murder victim, each identifying the accused as the person who
probably would kill her. The trial judge held both statements
(one written and one oral) to be dying declarations, but the
Supreme Court found that neither indicated any awareness that
the declarant’s death was imminent, as required by Rule 804b2,
and thus were inadmissible hearsay. The defense also objected
at trial on Confrontation grounds, but the trial court never ruled
on these.
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court devoted a great
deal of time and effort to the Confrontation claim. It found
that Aleasha’s note was indeed “testimonial” and ordinarily
inadmissible under both the state and federal confrontation
DYING, next page
13 Cobb v. State, 16 So.3d 207, 212 (Fla.App.2009); People v. Gilmore, 356 Ill.
App.3d 1023, 293 Ill.Dec. 323, 828 N.E.2d 293, 302 (2005); Wallace v. State, 836
N.E.2d 985, 996 (Ind.Ct.App.2005); State v. Jones, 287 Kan. 559, 197 P.3d 815, 822
(2008); Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 452 Mass. 236, 892 N.E.2d 299, 310–11 (2008);
People v. Taylor, 275 Mich.App. 177, 737 N.W.2d 790, 795 (2007); State v. Martin,
695 N.W.2d 578, 585–86 (Minn.2005); State v. Minner, 311 S.W.3d 313, 323, n. 9
(Mo.App.2010); Harkins v. State, 122 Nev. 974, 143 P.3d 706, 711 (2006); State
v. Calhoun, 189 N.C.App. 166, 657 S.E.2d 424, 427–28 (2008); State v. Lewis, 235
S.W.3d 136, 147–48 (Tenn.2007); Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 289 n. 20 (Tex.
Crim.App.2009); Satterwhite v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 557, 695 S.E.2d 555, 560
(2010).
14 Prof. Nicolas teaches law at the University of Washington, and is the author of
the casebook which I use to teach Evidence at UMLS.
15 The majority opinion in Mizenko noted in passing Crawford’s language footnote about the possibility of the dying declaration exemption from the Confrontation Clause, but like Crawford, the out-of-court statement at issue was not a dying
declaration.
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typing simply “dying declarations,” to cover cases decided
before the M.R.E. were adopted. This approach was much more
satisfactory, yielding not only the rule but also 24 cases,17 all
clauses because the defendant had had no chance to crossof them from the Montana Supreme Court (and none of them
examine her. However, the Court went on to consider and
Sternhagen).18 The third method of research was to go to the
eventually agree with the State’s argument that Sanchez’s
actual books (remember them?), in this case, West’s Montana
murder of Aleasha extinguished his constitutional rights to
Code Annotated.19 This time, under M.R.E. 804(b)(2), I found
confrontation, regardless of the motive behind the murder.
the same two cases as I found by doing the rule-based search
Since Sanchez was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court has
electronically. I looked in the actual “pocket part” supplement
taken the other tack: in order to forfeit a federal 6th Amendment
to update my results, but still did not find the Sanchez case even
right by wrongdoing, the defendant’s wrongful act must have
though it clearly was decided under 804(b)(2).
been intended to prevent the declarant/victim from testifying.
What’s the moral? Cover all your bases, use your common
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008). The Montana Supreme
sense. If you think the search results look thin, look again. For
Court is free to continue its broader interpretation of the
best results, cross-check your electronic results with the hard
grounds for forfeiting the state confrontation right16, of course,
copy.
but must follow Giles’s narrower version of forfeiture when the
th
defendant’s claim is based on the 6 Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Like the U.S. Supreme Court, Montana has not yet had to
face the issue of whether a dying declaration which meets the
Dying declarations may be “firmly rooted” and historic
hearsay exception also must survive a confrontation clause
exception to the hearsay rule, if not the Confrontation
objection, or whether the Montana Constitution impliedly
Clause. Montana explicitly included this exception to the
exempts these out of court statements from the right of the
hearsay prohibition in M.R.E. 804(b)(2), so out of court
accused to “meet the witnesses against him face-to-face.”
statements made by declarants who believe they are about to
DYING, from previous page

A WORD/WARNING ABOUT RESEARCH
For no particular reason, my preferred search engine for
legal research is WestlawNext. However, I lately have had
some disconcerting results, which I thought to share with my
readers as a cautionary tale. In researching this article, I first
typed in “Rule 804 hearsay” and got immediately to M.R.E.
804, including the text of the rule and the complete set of
Commission Comments. I then scrolled down to “Notes of
Decisions” and saw that there were 125 cases about Rule 804.
They are categorized according to their subject, so I went to
the category labeled “Statements Under Belief of Impending
Death.” There, I found only one case, the Sternhagen case,
which technically was decided under the FRE rather than the
MRE. I already knew about this case, but I also knew there
were other Montana dying declaration cases out there. I
modified my search, omitting the reference to the rule and
16 Ironically, the broader approach to forfeiture yields a narrower application of
the state’s confrontation right, apparently in contrast to the prior cases interpreting the state right as stronger for the defendant than the federal version.

die, discussing the cause or circumstances of that imminent
death, are admissible to prove the truth of the matters they
assert. However, my review of the use of this hearsay exception
indicates that it might itself be suffering from non-use, and in
danger of wasting away on the vine. Don’t forget that it is out
there, and that you can use it in both civil and criminal cases.
Happy Halloween.
Cynthia Ford is a professor at the University of Montana School of Law
where she teaches Civil Procedure, Evidence, Family Law, and Remedies.

17 Not all of the 24 cases actually involved application of Rule 804(b)(2), but at
least mentioned the term “dying declarations.” It is a lot easier for me to read a
case and decide that it is not useful than it is to work not even knowing the cases
are there.
18 It also indicated that there are 1,657 “secondary sources” on dying declarations. Wow!
19 Actually, I asked the law school’s brilliant research librarian, Cynthia Condit,
to do this for me. As always when I need help, and quick, she came through and
emailed the scan to me at my remote location. (Who says you can’t write at home
in your jammies?)

1-888-385-9119
Montana’s Lawyers Assistance Program Hotline
Call if you or a judge or attorney you know needs help with
stress and depression issues or drug or alcohol addiction .
www.montanabar.org

Page 35

